Xian He

Xian He is a Ph.D. candidate at Zhejiang University. He mainly works in the area of epistemology and ethics. He tries to understand belief, love, and emotion within a unified framework. When not doing philosophy, he spends most of his time reading novels, playing video games, and staying with his family.

He is also the builder and maintainer of this website. 



Visiting Student, University of Zurich


Ph.D. in Philosophy, Zhejiang University


M.A. in Philosophy, Sun Yat-Sen University


B.A. in Administration, Shandong Normal University



Paper in Progress

The Threshold of Weighing Evidential and Practical Reasons (under review)

Reason pragmatists maintain that both evidential and practical considerations can provide normative reasons for belief. For these pragmatists, a question arises about how to weigh these different types of reasons to determine what we should believe all things considered. According to Reisner and Howard’s models, there are two basic patterns of weighing reasons for belief: if the strength of practical reasons for belief exceeds a certain threshold, then practical reasons for belief are decisive or prior; otherwise, evidential reasons are decisive or prior. However, neither Howard nor Reisner provide clear criteria to locate such threshold. This paper aims to specify the criteria for locating the threshold. My hypothesis is that we have higher-order practical reasons that favor following certain evidential reasons in most cases, and that practical reasons for belief exceed the threshold if and only if they outweigh these higher-order reasons.

Fitting Love and Metaphysical Irreplaceability (under review)

According to the Quality Account of love, only lovable properties of the beloved person, such as beauty, wisdom and kindness, can make love for that person fitting. The account has been criticized for leading to implausible conclusions. If this account is correct, it would seem fitting to replace one’s lover with someone who possesses the same or more lovable properties, or stop loving someone who has lost these properties. Moreover, it is unclear how the Quality Account can differentiate between the fittingness conditions of love and other similar attitudes which seem also fitting in virtue of the same properties. I propose a new response to these objections. I argue that these challenges can be met by appealing to a distinctive lovable property that all objects of love share: their being metaphysically irreplaceable. Metaphysical Irreplaceability, along with other lovable properties, determines how worthy of love a person is. 

The Normativism of Belief and The Constitutive Error Argument (manuscript)

A Weird Consequentialism (in preparation)

When to Believe Against Evidence (in preparation)


The Threshold of Weighing Evidential and Practical Reasons

• “Epistemology in China” Conference, Shanghai, China, 09/2023.

• 2023 Beijing International Graduate Conference in Analytic Philosophy, Beijing, China, 01/2023 (Online)

Fitting Love, and Metaphysical Irreplaceability

• Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2023, Salzburg, Austria, 09/2023 (Online)

• 12th ZJU Contemporary Anglo-american Philosophy Workshop, Hangzhou, China, 03/2023

• 6th Beijing Analytical Philosophy Forum, Beijing, China, 11/2022 (Online)

The Normativism of Belief and The Constitutive Error Argument (信念的规范主义与错误构成论证) 

• 5th “Philosophy & Science” Young Scholar Workshop, Chengdu, China, 04/2023

• 5th ZJU Contemporary Anglo-american Philosophy Workshop, Hangzhou, China, 03/2022

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